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Abstract
Process Philosophy endeavours to replace the classical ontology of sub-
stances by a process ontology centered on notions of changes and transitions.
We argue, that the substantial and processual approach are mutually com-
plementary. Here, complementarity is to be understood in the sense of a
“Generalized Quantum Theory”, which is not restricted to physical phe-
nomena. From this point of view, restricting oneself to either substance or
process ontology would be as ill-advised as exclusively relying on position
or momentum observables in physics. A new view on Zeno’s paradox lends
itself. The meaning of an “internal energy observable”, complementary to
inner time, and its relationship to “akategorial states” of the human mind
will also be discussed.
1 Introduction
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a motion simultaneously both
as a unified process and as a sequence of intermediate positions. According
to a well known paradox of Zeno the Eleatic, a flying arrow seems to freeze
in its motion when attention is focussed to its momentary position at any
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given instant of time, noticing that it never occupies more space than given
by its length.
The Eleate Parmenides contests the reality of all kinds of motion and
change, reducing them to the status of mere illusions. For Plato, ideas are
essentially characterized by not being subject to temporality and change,
and they are the only worthy objects of pure philosophical contemplation.
In sharp contrast hereto, motion and change are central notions in the
thinking of Aristotle. However, he remains indebted to Plato insofar as he
understands motion exclusively from its incipient and final states, whereas
the precise way in which the transition between these states is achieved is
not described.
On the other hand, the presocratic philosopher Heraclite from Ephesos
attributes reality only to the flow of motion, pushing states of rest down to
a kingdom of semblance and illusion.
The question of the ontological status of time and change, for which
Heraclite and Plato mark antipodal positions has ever since been a princi-
pal subject of European philosophy. It is not possible at this place to give
an oversight, however sketchy, of the positions which are possible and have
been adopted on this matter. It is certainly fair to say, that positions closer
to Parmenides or Plato have been advocated more frequently and more in-
fluentially. The Aristotelian point of view is just one particularly prominent
example for this.
More recently, the antagonism between the Parmenidean and Heraclitean
position has again become an explicit subject of philosophical thought under
the headings ”Substance Ontology” versus ”Process Ontology”. The so-
called Process Philosophy [1] criticizes an alleged one-sided preference for
the substantial point of view and calls for a stronger emphasis on processual
elements in ontology.
Process Philosophy usually and with a good deal of justification refers to
A.N. Whitehead [2] as to one of their founding fathers. Indeed, Whitehead’s
philosophy is centered around notions of change, becoming and evolution.
In this study, we shall try to demonstrate that the difficulty, which be-
comes apparent in Zeno’s paradox has its origin in a complementary rela-
tionship of the substantial and the processual points of view.
Complementarity as we mean it here has been introduced by Niels Bohr
as a notion of quantum physics. Quantum observables like position and mo-
mentum (or velocity) are called complementary, if it is impossible to ascribe
sharp values of arbitrary precision simultaneously to both of them. Already
Bohr himself repeatedly pointed out that complementarity is a very gener-
al structure in the mutual relationship of different notions or approaches,
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which should apply and be relevant far beyond the realm of physics.
Elsewhere [3] we proposed a formal framework, called ”Weak Quantum
Theory”, which might also be denoted as ”Generalized Quantum Theory”.
In spite of its name, Generalized Quantum Theory is not a physical theory
but a theory of systems in a very general sense. It provides a wide and
flexible framework within which it is possible to talk about complementarity
(and entanglement) in a well defined and not merely metaphorical way and
predict their existence far beyond the range of phenomena accessible to a
description in terms of physics.
Generalized Quantum Theory shares with ordinary quantum theory the
fundamental notions of ”system”, ”state” and ”observable”. The structure
of Generalized Quantum Theory should be realized whenever observations
have an essential and inevitable influence on the state of a system. This
is clearly true in an exemplary way for the human mind as seen from the
inner perspective of self observation. This is the application of General-
ized Quantum Theory which we primarily have in mind in this study. We
shall relate the incompatibility of substantial and processual approaches to
a complementarity of certain mental observables of time and transition .
In more detail, we shall proceed in the following way:
In section 2 we give a simplified description of Generalized Quantum
Theory in order to provide the necessary background to follow our sub-
sequent arguments. The significance of Generalized Quantum Theory is
illustrated by mentioning some of its applications, which have been worked
out elsewhere [3],[5],[6].
Section 3 elaborates on the notion of observables in Generalized Quan-
tum Theory in particular pertaining to the human mind. A comparison with
Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects (”Gegenstandslehre”) may be helpful to
emancipate oneself from an unjustified narrow preconception prejudiced by
the notion of observables in physics. In the spirit of Meinong, intentionality
and perspectivity are emphasized as essential features of observables, whose
creation or identification will be described as a genuine creative act of the
human mind. Also essential is the notion of partitioning, i.e. a separation
of the totality of the world into different parts by suitable observables. The
”epistemic split” into observer and an observed object is the first and most
fundamental example underlying every act of cognition.
Section 4 deals with psychic time observables and their relationship to
physical time and to time complementary observables. This second class
of observables should be closely related to notions of process philosophy.
We also talk about a possible resolution of Zeno’s paradox and give an
explanation for the finite duration of the psychological ”now”.
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Section 5 is directly devoted to the complementarity of substance and
process. Both ways of description will turn out to be indispensable. Dogged-
ly sticking to one way only would be as ill advised as if an physicist would
insist in using only position or momentum observables but not both.
Section 6 is an appendix in which a short story of Jorge Luis Borges
is quoted to demonstrate that an exaggeration of the process philosophical
stand point will lead into absurdities. On the other hand, we point out
again how deeply the human mind as seen from an internal perspective
differs from a classical physical system and that in many cases notions of
process philosophy seem to provide a more adequate description.
2 Generalized Quantum Theory
Generalized Quantum Theory [3] [4] is not a physical theory but a general
theory of systems which could also be called non commuting system theory.
It arose from ordinary quantum theory in algebraic form by simplification
and weakening of its axioms, leaving out everything which is specific for the
world of physics. The remaining structure is still rich enough to incorporate
and predict phenomena like complementarity and entanglement in a much
wider framework but still in a formally well defined sense.
The basic notions of system, state and observable are taken over from
ordinary quantum theory.
• A system Σ is any part of reality in its most general sense, which
can, at least in principle, be separated from the rest of the world
an can be made an object of investigation. A system in Generalized
Quantum Theory may be very different from a system in Physics, it
may for instance, consist of an individual human mind as seen from an
internal perspective of self observation. Such systems will be our main
concern in the following sections. Another example of a Generalized
Quantum system would be formed by the mental contents of a group
of researchers investigating the Elizabethan English drama.
• A system has the capacity to reside in several states z. Epistemically,
a state describes the degree of knowledge an observer possesses about
the system. In contrast to ordinary quantum theory, it is not assumed
that the set Z of all states of a system can be described by the structure
of a linear Hilbert space.
• Every observable A corresponds to a feature of the system, which can
be investigated in a (more or less) meaningful way. Let A denote the
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totality of all observables of a system. The most important feature
of observables in Generalized Quantum Theory, shared with ordinary
quantum theory, is the fact that the application of observables will in
general change the state of a system. Indeed, observables can be iden-
tified with functions on the states. This means: Every observable A
associates to every state z another state A(z). As functions on states,
observables A and B can be concatenated by applying first B then
A on the states z. The composite observable AB is then defined by
AB(z) = A(B(z)). Two observables A,B are called compatible if they
commute with each other, i.e. if AB = BA. Otherwise, if AB 6= BA,
they are called incompatible or complementary. In ordinary physical
quantum theory, observables can also be added and multiplied with
complex numbers, and to every observable A there exists a conjugate
observable A∗, such that the set A of all observables is endowed with a
rich so-called C∗-structure. In Generalized Quantum Theory only the
multiplication described above is defined, and the totality of observ-
ables only has the much simpler structure of a so-called semigroup.
”Measurement” is another fundamental notion of both Generalized an
ordinary quantum theory. Measurement means that the investigation
belonging to an observable is really performed and that a result of
the investigation is obtained. After the measurement, the state of the
system will in general differ from the state before the measurement.
For the examples of the individual mind and the group of Elizabethan
researchers it is immediately clear that measurement and application
of observables will change their states. Already in ordinary quantum
theory, the process of measurement and the obtainment of a result
are not completely describable as a dynamical process of physics, al-
though, of cause, they are related to a physical interaction between
a measurement device and the physical system under investigation.
Rather ”measurement” and ”reduction of state” are primary and large-
ly irreducible notions of physical quantum theory. This is also true for
Generalized Quantum Theory, which in its most general form does not
even contain a notion of dynamics.
Generalized Quantum Theory is defined by a set of axioms. For readers
with a background in formal mathematics we here list the most important
ones. Other readers may skip them in reading.
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• Associated to every observable A there is a set specA, called spectrum
of A. specA is just the set of all possible outcomes of the investiga-
tion (”measurement”) pertaining to the observable A. In Generalized
Quantum Theory, specA will not necessarily be a set of numbers, be-
cause the outcome of an observation may be of qualitative rather than
quantitative nature.
• Propositions are special observables P , which are reproduced under
multiplication: PP = P, and whose spectra specP can only contain
the two elements
”
yes “ and
”
no“. They simply correspond to yes-
no questions about the system Σ. To every proposition P there is
an associated negated proposition P¯ , which is compatible with P in
the sense defined above. For compatible P1 and P2 there exist a
conjunction P1∧P2 = P1P2 and a disjunction P1 ∨P2 = P1 ∧ P2. The
laws of Boolean logic are valid for compatible propositions.
• If z is a state and if for the proposition P the answer ”yes” is obtained
in the state z, then P (z) = PP (z) = P (P (z)) is a state, for which
P yields the answer ”yes” with certainty. This is a reflection of the
active, constructive character of measurement in quantum theory as
both verification and preparation.
• The following axiom generalizes the spectral property of observables
in ordinary quantum theory and allows to reduce all observables to
propositions: To every observable A and to every element α in specA
there is an associated proposition Aα, which just means that α is the
result of a measurement of A. Then
AαAβ = AβAα = 0 for α 6= β, AAα = AαA,
∨
α∈specA
Aα = 1l,
where 0 and 1l are trivial propositions which are never or always true
respectively. The observables A and B are compatible if and only if
Aα and Bβ are compatible for all α ∈ specA and β ∈ specB.
The concepts of complementarity and entanglement are meaningful and
important in Generalized Quantum Theory as well. For complementary
observables A and B, the order in which they are measured is decisive. In
Generalized Quantum Theory as well as in ordinary quantum theory it is in
general not possible to find a state z for which both A and B have a well
determined value.
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Entanglement is a special case of complementarity. It can arise, if glob-
al observables pertaining to the system as a whole are complementary to
local observable pertaining to parts of the system. In an entangled state,
for instance in a state, in which a global observable has a well defined val-
ue, the values of local observables are in general not determined. However,
there are typical interactionless entanglement correlations between the re-
sults of measurements for local observables belonging to different parts of
the system.
We explicitly stress that Generalized Quantum Theory, at least in its
minimal version presented here, does not associate quantified probabilities
to the different outcomes of the measurement of an observable A. This is
closely related to the absence of any Hilbert space structure for the set of
states Z.
Time is not a fundamental notion of Generalized Quantum Theory, and
even if time observables exist, there is not necessarily any concept of dy-
namics or Hamiltonean. Planck’s constant h, which in ordinary quantum
theory measures the degree of non commutativity, has no privileged place
in Generalized Quantum Theory.
Generalized Quantum Theory is a universal and very flexible framework
theory. It should prove its value in situations, in which, just like in ordinary
quantum theory, measurement has an inevitable influence on the state of
a system. This study mainly deals with systems containing human minds,
which are particularly clear examples for such a situation.
Let us mention here some other applications, of Generalized Quantum
Theory which have been proposed and worked out in more or less detail:
• Countertranference in mentally closely bound groups of persons [3].
The frequently reported phenomenon, that members of such a group
experience mental contents or emotions which do not seem to belong
to themselves but to other members may be described as an effect
of entanglement correlation between mental observables of different
group members. The relevant global observables are related to the
degree of mental concord or other collective observables of mood and
disposition.
• H. Walach e.a [7] propose to explain the illusive efficiency of homeopa-
thy, which is otherwise hard grasp, by entanglement correlations.
• So-called synchronistic phenomena in the sense of W. Pauli and C.G.
Jung admit an interpretation as entanglement correlations. [8], [11],
[9]
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• Generalized Quantum Theory as such is timeless. In the study [6]
a scenario is described how, starting from internal time as a form of
existence as a conscious being, time observables can be identified and
their relationship to physical time can be clarified. In section 5 we
shall be more explicit on this matter.
• Bistable stimuli like Necker’s cube can be perceived in two different
ways. Confronted to such a bistable stimulus, conception of a person
will switch back and forth more or less regularly between the two
different interpretations. H. Atmanspacher, Th. Filk and H. Ro¨mer
[5] give a quantitative description of the switching process in terms
of Generalized Quantum Theory. In particular, a relation between
three different time constants of perception physiology is derived in
agreement with experiment.
• In sociological systems, entanglement correlations are conceivable be-
tween attitudes and actions of different individuals [12].
• P. beim Graben and H. Atmanspacher [13] have demonstrated that
the structure of Generalized Quantum Theory may even be realized in
stochastic dynamical systems of classical mechanics.
3 Observables
We already mentioned that observables are associated to any feature of a
system which can be investigated in whatever way. In Generalized Quantum
Theory, a system can be quite different from a system in physics and much
more multifarious. Correspondingly, also observables will be more complex
and manifold. They are the subject of this section.
We already saw that observables are reducible to propositions or, more
precisely, to questions attributed to propositions. As a sentence in human
language, propositions will in general contain both nouns and verbs. Already
for this reason it would be premature to identify observables with nouns or
concepts as might be suggested by the example of physical observables like
position or momentum.
We shall in particular dwell on three characteristic features of observ-
ables:
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a) Intentionality, i.e. directedness on something else, as already evident
from their relationship to questions
b) Perspectivity, because questions are posed from the perspective of
those who ask them
c) Structuring activity, because it is by the kind and horizon of his ques-
tions that the investigator prestructures the object of his investigation
and in a way even constitutes it.
To a)
We are mainly interested in observables as features of the human mind
as seen from a position of self observation. To avoid the danger of an er-
roneously narrow notion of observables, a look on the theory of objects
(”Gegenstandslehre”) [14] of the philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853-1920)
may be helpful. For Meinong, object (”Gegenstand”) is everything, which
can somehow be given to the human mind, and he endeavors to list ob-
jects as completely as possible. As a disciple of Franz Brentano he strongly
emphasizes the intentionality of these objects of the human mind, their di-
rectedness onto something. Parallel to the four principal kind of activity
of the human mind: imagining, thinking, feeling and desiring, he decides
between four classes of objects (”Gegensta¨nde”)
• Objects (in the narrower sense): conceptions, directed onto ”things”
• Objectiva: directed onto judgements or propositions
• Dignitativa: directed on values like ”good”, ”true” or ”beautiful”
• Desiderativa: desires, obligations, purposes
The first class of objects by no means comprises only conceptions of
really existing things. On the contrary, an unbiased look at the human
mind reveals that such conceptions are rather an exception. In this context
Meinong talks about a ”prejudice in favor of the real” (”Vorurteil zu Gunsten
des Wirklichen”) prevailing in the traditional philosophy, which is primarily
devoted to cognition.
Within the four classes Meinong differentiates between simple objects
and composite objects, composed of objects of the same or different classes.
Objects of the last three classes are always composite. Composedness cannot
be continued to infinity but ends up with objects of the first class after a
finite number of steps.
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We are now able to locate the position of observables of the human
mind in Meinong’s classification: In Generalized Quantum Theory they cor-
respond to objectiva, which in turn may be composed of objects of all four
classes.
To b)
Already the name of ”observables” tells that they are related to an ob-
server, whom one should imagine to be endowed with at least some minimal
degree of consciousness. It depends on the horizon and the perspective of
the observer what he is able and willing to observe, in other words, what
are the observables of an observed system. Perspective and horizon of the
observer will change, not the least as a result of his observations. Thereby
the totality of observables assumes a genuinely dynamic character. Both
in ordinary and in Generalized Quantum Theory, systems only arise as ob-
served systems. However, in ref [6] we showed a way to conceive the whole
of the world as a limiting system of a process of repeated enlargement of
systems. In physics, this is successfully done in Quantum Cosmology. The
”universe” of Generalized Quantum Theory should be much more compre-
hensive, rather like C:G: Jung’s unus mundus [11], [8], which is organized
by archetypes and neutral with respect to a distinction between mind and
matter.
To c)
We already mentioned that setting up and identifying observables must
be recognized as a crucial constitutive mental act. This is true in particular
for the partitioning of a system Σ into subsystems Σi, which may be per-
formed in many different ways under various points of view. By this act of
partitioning, the subsystems are not just registered but, together with the
total system literarily constituted.
G. Mahler [15] repeatedly and vigorously pointed out the key importance
of the act of partitioning into subsystems.
Partitioning is done by means of partition observables whose different
values allow to decide between different subsystems. In physics, the position
observable Q is the fundamental partition observable identifying subsystems
by their different positions. Indeed, it seems to be justified to say that the
realm of physics is coincident with the range of applicability of partitioning
with respect to different positions. From this perspective, the physical world
really looks like the world of res extensae.
If, with all due care, the whole of the world, the unus mundus, is con-
ceived as a system, then the first and all-decisive partition, prior to any act
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of cognition, is the epistemic split into observer and observed. Without such
a split it is impossible to talk about knowledge to be obtained by someone
about something. The precise position of this split may be movable, for
instance in the transition from the external perspective to the internal per-
spective of self observation, but the split itself can never be avoided.
One definitely has to expect that different partition observables leading
to different positions of the epistemic split may be complementary to each
other. In such situations, results of cognition obtained from different cog-
nitional perspectives will be incompatible. This incompatibility would not
be due to the simple fact that different perspectives cannot be assumed at
the same time, rather the results obtained from one perspective would lose
their secured validity in a different perspective.
There might even exist observables of the unus mundus in the sense
described under point b), which are complementary to every epistemic split.
They would correspond to features of the ”universe” which are inaccessible
from any perspective opposing an observer to something he observes.
In physics, the epistemic split arises under the name of the Heisenberg
cut between the measuring instrument and the measured physical object. It
can be investigated to some extent by physical methods in the theory of the
measurement process in quantum physics, where a composite system con-
sisting of a measuring devise and an object to be measured is analyzed. The
measuring instrument and the measured object are driven into an entangled
state, and the usefulness of the measuring instrument has its origin precisely
in the ensuing entanglement correlations. The transition to the entangled
state is purely deterministic, and the typical stochastic and indeterministic
features of quantum theory only emerge after applying the Heisenberg cut,
reducing the composed system to the measuring instrument and interpreting
the measured value as a statement about the measured object.
Interestingly enough, in physics, there is a symmetry between measure-
ment apparatus and measured object in the following sense: Reduction of
the state of the composite system to the measured object results in the same
probability distribution as reduction to the measurement devise.
One may wonder, whether such a symmetry between observer and ob-
served holds true also in Generalized Quantum Theory. A symmetry of this
kind would secure the adequacy of the findings obtained by the observer
and would correspond to a tight correlation between interior and exterior
world. What is observed, is mirrored in the observer, the observed mirrors
the observer, and both are part of the same universe.
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4 Substance and Process Observables
Generalized Quantum Theory as such does not contain any reference to
time. Also C.G. Jung’s unus mundus is entirely timeless. On the other hand,
every conscious individual is intimately bound to temporality as a mode of its
existence. Employing a distinction introduced by McTaggart [16], individual
subjective time is an A-Time, which is directed from past into future and in
which presence is distinguished by a particular and unmistakable feature of
”now”. By this, subjective A-Time differs from physical B-Time which is of
poorer structure, undirected and without a distinguished ”now”. Rather, all
points of physical time are equivalent marks on a homogenous scale. There
can be no doubt, that the subjective times of different individuals are closely
correlated with the subjective times of other individuals and with systems
in the external world like planets or clocks.
H. Primas [10] and the author [6] proposed different but in many
respects also similar scenarios, how time could emerge from a primordially
timeless unus mundus. Here we shall briefly sketch the proposal of ref. [6],
which contains the following steps:
First step: after an epistemic split of the unus mundus, subsystems Σi
can be identified, which correspond to conscious individuals.
Second step: In these subsystems Σi, subjective time observables Ti can
be identified, whose values are connected by strong entanglement correla-
tions with observables of other subsystems. (The mechanism according to
which certain observables qualify themselves as time observables is analo-
gous to the emergence of a time observable via the timeless Wheeler- de
Witt equation [17] of quantum cosmology.) The subjective time observables
Ti are of A-type. So, in this scenario, the origin of time is located in the
subjective A-Times of conscious individuals.
Third step: By strong entanglement correlations, the subjective A-Times
Ti are not only related to each others but also to observables TI of clocklike
physical systems ΣI .
Fourth step: By a long and complicated process with many intermedi-
ate stages, time will be more and more transported into the outside world
and related to observables of physical systems chosen in such a way that
entanglement correlations become as strict as possible. The physical time
eventually emerging in this procedure has lost its character as an A-Time
and is left as a B-Time of simpler structure.
Irrespectively of any concrete scenario for the emergence of time, we
shall only assume in the sequel that there are subsystems Σi,which can be
identified with conscious individuals and that among the mental observables
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of Σi there are observables Ti of the type of an A-Time. Although it is not
absolutely necessary, one would tend to expect TiTj = TjTi for different
individuals.
Now, considering one such subsystem Σi we can divide all observables,
in particular those pertaining to Σi, into two different classes:
A) Time compatible observables R with RTi = TiR. Such observables
commute with the time observable Ti. They are either direct functions of Ti
or have no relation to time whatsoever. In this case, a measurement of R
and an attribution of a value of time will in no way influence or disturb each
other. Examples of time compatible observables are the position observable
Q or its internal representation in Σi and observables of shape and colour,
because spacial localizations and shapes as well as colours are completely
unrelated to time.
Time compatible observables describe timeless features of a system like
the sum of angles in a triangle or Platonic ideas. We propose to identify
such observables with observables referring to notions of an ontology of
substances as mentioned in the Introduction.
Henceforth we shall call such observables Substance Observables. In the
sense of section 3, Substance Observables are to be associated to nominal
sentences (in question form).
B) Time complementary observables S with S 6= TiS. Attributing a value
to S and attributing a precise mark of time are incompatible in the sense
of complementarity. A typical example of a time complementary observable
in quantum physics is given by the energy observable. A location in time
and a precise value of the energy cannot be achieved together with arbitrary
precision. Quite generally, observables will be time complementary, if they
are related to processes or changes with time.
From now on, we shall call time complementary observables Process Ob-
servables. They correspond to notions in an ontology of processes and are
generically related to verbal sentences (in question form).
Even if a time variable Ti and the concepts of Substance and Process
Observables are defined, this does not imply the existence of dynamics in a
system of Generalized Quantum Theory. The notion of process applies to
observables and is more general than the notion of a dymamical equation
regulating the time development of states of a system. In particular, we
cannot in general expect the existence of an observable generating all time
changes of the states.
One should expect that Process Observables are complementary to Sub-
stance Observables, because the notions of endurance and change should be
incompatible in a generalized quantum system. From a formal point of view,
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there is of cause a possibility of observables commuting with both Ti and all
Process Observables, but such observables, if they existed at all would have
nothing to do with the distinction between substance and process and can
be disregarded for our purposes.
The complementarity of Substance Observables and Process Observables
in Generalized Quantum Theory leads to a simple resolution of Zeno’s para-
dox: The position of a moving body at any given time is described by a
Substance Observable like the position observable Q, whereas the motion
itself is described by a Process Observable. The complementarity of them
explains, why the quantity of motion and the intermediate position cannot
ascribed together with arbitrary precision. In the same way, in ordinary
quantum mechanics, the notion of the orbit of a moving body, which assigns
a position to every point t of time loses its precise meaning.
Quite generally, for every change in the inner or outer world, one should
expect a complementarity between Substance Observables for intermediate
states and Process Observables for describing the phenomenon of transition
itself.
In quantum mechanics, the energy observable is privileged by being max-
imally complementary to physical time. In fact, the energy observables
functions as the generator of changes with time.
At the beginning of this section and in ref [6] we introduced internal
subjective time observables Ti belonging to conscious individuals Σi and
contended that the physical time variable T arises from the observables Ti
by operationalization, externalization, purification and structural simplifica-
tion. It is now natural to wonder whether for the individual Σi there exists
a privileged Process Observable Ei of energy type, whose relationship to Ti
is analogous to the relationship between the physical time T and the phys-
ical energy observable E. Indeed, the notion of physical energy developed
slowly from an intuitive notion of energy as the result of a long process of
of purification and idealization. This intuitive energy notion should help to
arrive at an idea about the character of such individual energy observables
Ei. Intuitively, the notion of energy originally contained an element of will
and of the ability to bring about changes. The notion of physical energy is
both sharper an narrower: it is the generator of changes in time but it is
void of any element of will or desire.
In any case, it seems to be natural to assume the existence of a special
Process Observable Ei of energy type for the system Σi. Hoping not to give
rise to misunderstandings, we tentatively call this observable mental energy.
There will be a complementarity relation TiEi 6= EiTi.
This complementarity of internal time and mental energy provides an
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easy explanation for an important result of the physiology of perception:
The subjective ”now” has a finite duration of the order of magnitude of
0.03 seconds. Below this threshold of temporal distance, events cannot be
arranged in their correct temporal order. Because of the complementarity
of physical time and physical energy, an ever more precise localization in
time is possible only at the expense of an ever increasing physical energy.
Likewise, localization in subjective time should be restricted by a limited
supply of mental energy.
.
5 Complementarity of Substance and Process
It should have become clear by now that, in particular for proper descrip-
tion of the activities of the human mind, both notions of substance and
process are indispensable. The problem is to incorporate both into a coher-
ent model of thought. A remarkable attempt in this direction has been made
by Atmanspacher and Fach [19], who implement ideas of William James in
a the framework of a formal model. Let us quote a passage from James’
”Principles of Psychology” dealing with the ”stream of thoughts”.
When the rate [of change of the subjective state] is slow we are aware of
the object of our thought in a comparatively restful and stable way. When
rapid, we are aware of the passage, a relation, a transition from it or be-
tween it and something else. . . . Let us call the resting-places the “substan-
tive parts” and the places of flight the “transitive parts” of the stream of
thoughts. It then appears that the main end of our thinking is at all times
the attainment of some other subjective part than the one from which we
have just been dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the transitive
parts is to lead from one substantive conclusion to another.
Now it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts as what
they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look
at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them. Whilst
if we wait till the conclusion be reached, it so exceeds them in vigour and
stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in a its glare. Let anyone
try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and
he will see how difficult the introspective observation of the transitive act
is. . . . The results of this introspective difficulty are baleful. If to hold fast
and observe the transitive parts of the thought’s stream be so hard, the great
blunder to which all schools are liable must be the failure to register them,
and the undue emphasizing of the more substantive parts of the stream.
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Atmanspacher and Fach model James ”stream of thoughts” by a Dy-
namic System. The mental state z is a point in a manifold of high dimen-
sionality. The motion of the state z is driven by a potential, a function V ,
which describes mental dispositions and modes of functioning.
The dynamics of mental activity is the assumed to be governed by a
Dynamic System, i.e. a classical ordinary differential equation of the form
dz(t)
dt
= ∇V (z(t)) + ...
whose solution z(t), determines the mental state at time t.
Particular importance must be attributed to eqilibrium states z0, in
which the system can reside for an arbitrarily long span of time. They
are characterized by the condition ∇V (z0) = 0. These equilibrium states
may be divided into stable and unstable equilibrium states. After a little
deviation from a stable equilibrium state zs, the state of the system will
remain in the vicinity of zs whereas after a small deviation from an un-
stable equilibrium state zi the state of the system will migrate far away
from zi. Atmanspacher and Fach propose to identify the stable equilibrium
states with the ”substantive parts” of William James’ ”stream of thoughts”,
whereas the unstable equilibrium states are identified with the ”transitive
parts”.These latter states are called ”akategorial states” by Atmanspacher
and Fach. Generic states are neither substantive nor akategorial but even
more unstable than unstable equilibrium states.
It is suggestive but in no way cogent to identify the ”mental states” of
Atmanspacher and Fach with states of the brain. In this study, we focus
on the human mind as seen from an internal perspective; the relationship
between brain and mind is not topical.
As self observation will inevitably change the state of the human mind,
a generalized quantum theoretical formalisms seems to lend itself as the
appropriate framework of description.
Our approach and the approach of Atmanspacher and Fach need not be
in conflict with each other, both of them should rather be considered as
attempts to cast a view on the human mind from different perspectives.
In the spirit of Generalized Quantum Theory, it appears natural to start
out from the distinction between Substance Observables compatible with
the inner time Ti and Process Observables complementary to Ti in a system
Σi describing a conscious individual.
Substance Observables correspond to contents of the conscious human
mind which are timeless in the sense that any localization in time is irrelevant
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for them. Process Observables are related to contents which resist and es-
cape from localization in time and are incompatible with it. The importance
of such observables for the human mind is evident: already consciousness
itself is experienced rather as a stream or flow than as an ensemble of time
localizable parts. ”Mental energy” as described above is another important
example of a Process Observable of the human mind.
Substance and Process States of the human mind can be defined in the
following way: Quite generally, an eigenstate z of an observable A is defined
as a state z, in which it is possible to ascribe with certainty to A precisely
one value in the set of its possible values given by the spectrum of A. (In
the notation of section 2 this can be formalized as Aα(z) = z for an α in
specA.)
Now, Substance States are simply eigenstates of Substance Observables
and Process States are eigenstates of Process Observables.
Substance states admit an additional localization in time, but this is in
general irrelevant as, for example, in the statement: ”This is a Square and
it is twelve o’clock”. Process States resist localization in time, and if it is
attempted nevertheless, this will change the state.
The complementarity between Substance and Process Observables is cru-
cial for our approach to the human mind in terms of a Generalized Quantum
Theory. As described above, it explains the finite extension of the pycho-
logical ”now” and gives a natural resolution of Zeno’s paradox. For intro-
spection, complementarity in the sense that one imagination may annihilate
another one is an every days’s experience.
Already for the reasons given by William James, it is harder to describe
a Process State than to experience it. Process States resist the prevailing
ontology of substances. Introspectively, a Process State will escape if one
tries to get hold of it by means of Substance Observables.
Atmanspacher and Fach [19] devote a lot of care to a more precise de-
scription of Process States, which they call akategorial states.
Good examples for such states are:
1. Memory states, in which a process in the past is memorized as a whole
2.
”
Flow“ states, in which a person is so deeply submerged in an activity
that time seems to disappear
3. Meditative states of pure consciousness. Atmanspacher and Fach char-
acterize them by the following properties:
• Pure consciousness of universal unity
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• Absence of any localizability in space and time
• Feeling of ultimate reality
• Feeling of unification of opposites and of peace and harmony
• Difficulty of conceptual description
In our generalized quantum theoretical approach, these meditative states
are plausible candidates for eigenstates of the mental energy. In ordinary
quantum physics, the eigenstates of the time complementary energy observ-
able are the so-called stationary states, time independent states resisting any
temporal localization. As already mentioned, mental energy also contains
an element of will and desire, and it should have eigenstates, which are not
only non localizable in time, but for which also will has come to rest and no
change in time is desired.
In any case, we believe that we have demonstrated that Generalized
Quantum Theory is a very wide and flexible scheme, which, applied to sys-
tems like Σi provides a conceptual framework, from which views can be cast
on the human mind from a new and possibly interesting perspective. Com-
plementarity is predicted as a general feature and expected to hold inevitably
for Substance and Process Observables both of which are indispensable for
a complete and satisfactory description of the system. Moreover, the reso-
lution of Zeno’s paradox and the finite duration of the subjective ”now” are
rather surprising consequences of the general scheme of Generalized Quan-
tum Theory . A more detailed and in some parts perhaps even quantitative
analysis of such systems would require a concrete model for the state space
Zi and for the set Ai of observables as functions on Zi . A complete de-
scription of this kind seems to be out of reach for a long time to come. Still,
we hope to come back later to a more detailed quantum like description of
human mind and consciousness.
6 Appendix: Tlo¨n
Process philosophy emphasizes the importance of dynamic process oriented
notions describing motions and changes. Referring to authorities like Al-
fred North Whitehead [2] it criticizes an allegedly exaggerated weight put
on timeless notions related to enduring substances or entities in European
Philosophy, which are blamed to hamper a proper understanding of phe-
nomena of utmost importance like renewal, innovation and creativity. In
our terminology, process philosophy calls for a turn away from a one-sided
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usage of Substance Observables and for more attention to Process observ-
ables. It may be an exciting and instructive exercise to try to get along
without Substance Observables as far as possible and to discard notions of
time and substance.
Reflections on time and the attempt to demonstrate its illusionary char-
acter are favored subjects of the learned Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges
(1899-1986). In his short story
”
Tlo¨n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius“ [18] he de-
scribes in a wonderfully subtle, free and playful way a Utopian planet Tlo¨n,
whose inhabitants do not have any notions of substances.
Living in a world which is organized in accordance with process philos-
ophy and does not know about underlying enduring substances, the inhabi-
tants of Tlo¨n have no substantives in their languages. As a further natural
consequence, their philosophical views are strictly idealistic, Borges says
Berkelian. (Indeed, reductionist materialism as we know it is distinguished
by a pronounced substance ontology.) Borges describes the Tlo¨nians, who
are obviously completely free of the ”prejudice in favour of the real” scorned
by Meinong, in the following way:
Hume declared for all time that while Berkeley’s arguments admit not
the slightest refutation, they inspire not the slightest conviction. That pro-
nouncement is entirely true with respect to earth, entirely false with respect
to Tlo¨n. The nations of that planet are, congenitally, idealistic. Their lan-
guages and those things derived from their language -religion, literature,
metaphysics- presuppose idealism. For the people of Tlo¨n, the world is not
an amalgam of objects in space; it is a heterogeneous series of independent
acts -the world is successive, temporal, but not spacial.
About the languages of Tlo¨n:
There are no nouns in the conjectural Ursprache of Tlo¨n, from which
its ”present day” languages and dialects derive: There are impersonal verbs,
modified by monosyllabic suffixes (or prefixes) functioning as adverbs. For
example, there is no noun that corresponds to our word ”moon”, but there
is a verb which in English would be ”to moonate” or to ”enmoon”. ”The
moon rose above the river” is ”hlo¨r u fang axaxaxas mlo¨”, or, as Xul Solar
succinctly translates ”Upwards behind the onstreaming it moonded”
That principle applies to the languages of the southern hemisphere. In
the northern hemisphere (about whose Ursprache Volume Eleven contains
very little information), the primary unit is not the verb but the monosyllabic
adjective. Nouns are formed by stringing together adjectives. One does not
say ”moon”; one says ”aerial-bright above dark-round” or ”soft- amberish-
celestial” or any other string...
There are famous poems composed of a single enormous word, this word
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is a ”poetic object” created by the poet. The fact that no one believes in the
reality expressed by these nouns means, paradoxically, that there is no limit
in their number.
At this place, we should annotate that in many human languages, for
instance in Japanese, a special class of verbs is reserved to what are adjec-
tives in European languages. From this point of view, the difference between
the languages of the northern and southern hemisphere looks less radical in
comparison to the shared absence of nouns.
A few lines later:
Space is not conceived as having duration in time. The perception of a
cloud of smoke on the horizon and then the countryside on fire and then the
half-extinguished cigarette that produced the scorched earth is considered an
example of the association of ideas.
The lack of understanding of the Tlo¨nians for enduring substances, goes
so far, that things quite common for us look scandalous for them:
Of all the doctrines of Tlo¨n, none has caused more uproar than mate-
rialism. Some thinkers have formulated this philosophy (generally with less
clarity than zeal) as though putting forth a paradox. In order to make this
inconceivable thesis more easily understood, an eleventh-century heresiarch
conceived the sophism of the nine copper coins, a paradox as scandalously
famous on Tlo¨n as the Eleatic aporiae to ourselves. There are many versions
of that ”specious argument”, with varying numbers of coins and discoveries;
the following is the most common:
”On Tuesday, X is walking along a deserted road and loses nine copper
coins. On Thursday, Y finds four coins in the road, their luster somewhat
dimmed by Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins in the
road. Friday morning X finds two coins on the veranda of his house.”
From this story the heresiarch wished to deduce the reality -i.e., the con-
tinuity in time- of those nine recovered coins. ”It is absurd”, he said, ”to
imagine that four of the coins did not exist from Tuesday to Thursday, three
from Tuesday to Friday afternoon, two from Tuesday to Friday morning. It
is logical to think that they in fact did exist -albeit in some secret way that
we are forbidden to understand- at every moment of those three periods of
time.”
The language of Tlo¨n resisted formulating this paradox; most people did
not understand it.
Such a scandalous paradox must be abolished :
They explained that ”equality” is one thing and ”identity” another, and
they formulated a sort of reductio ad absurdum -the hypothetical case of
nine men who on nine successive nights experience a sharp pain. Would it
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not be absurd, they asked, to pretend that the men had suffered one and the
same pain?
At length and in a very elucidating way, Borges dwells on the philosoph-
ical systems of Tlo¨n. The incapability of the Tlo¨nians for any notions of
substances exhibits itself in the phenomenon of hro¨nir 1, as Borges calls it.
Century upon century of idealism could hardly have failed to influence re-
ality. In the most ancient regions of Tlo¨n one may, not infrequently, observe
the duplication of lost objects: Two persons are looking for a pencil; the first
person finds it, but says nothing; the second person finds a second pencil,
no less real but more in keeping with his expectations. These secondary ob-
jects are called ”hro¨nir”, and they are, though awkwardly so, slightly longer.
Until recently, hro¨nir were the coincidental offspring of distraction and for-
getfulness. It is hard to believe that they have been systematically produced
for only about a hundred years....A curious bit of information: hro¨nir of the
second and third remove -hro¨nir derived from another hro¨n and hro¨nir de-
rived from the hro¨n of a hro¨n- exaggerate the aberrations of the first; those
of the fifth remove are almost identical; those of the ninth can be confused
with those of the second; and those of the eleventh remove exhibit a purity of
line that even the originals do not exhibit. The hro¨nir of the twelfth remove
begin to degenerate....
Things duplicate themselves on Tlo¨n; they also tend to grow vague or
”sketchy”, and to lose detail when they begin to be forgotten. The classic
example is a doorway that continued to exist so long as a certain beggar
frequented it, but which was lost to sight when he died. Sometimes, a few
birds, a horse, have saved the ruins of an amphitheater.
Borges’ ingenious delineation of the world of Tlo¨n suggests the following
observations:
1) An exaggeration of process ontology will result in absurd consequences.
Some people stipulate that everything that can be captured by stable con-
cepts were balefully rigid and did injustice to the intimately dynamic char-
acter of the world. Proponents of such an opinion are in danger to fall victim
to the paradox of the nine copper coins.
2) On the other hand, the world of the human mind and its products
and fictions is similar to the world of Tlo¨n in many respects and really or-
dered rather according to a process ontology. This already becomes evident
from the refutation of the copper coin paradox employing the example of
1The word ”hro¨nir” seems to be a free invention of Borges with an Icelandic appeal.
In Icelandic dictionaries I only found
”
hro¨nn“ with plural
”
hrannir“, a poetic word with
the meaning ”wave”.
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human pain as quoted above. Even more so, on the field of fashions, trends
and countermovements hro¨nir will be quite common under the disguise of
repeated rediscoveries. So, in some situations, the process ontology of Tlo¨n
may be superior to the substance ontology we are used to.
By the way, in Borges’ short story, tlo¨n itself is described as a product
of the inventive human mind, which is about to be replaced by the yet more
complex orbis tertius
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